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Was the NAACP right to fire one of its lawyers for representing the KKK?
It's hard to think of a more mismatched
attorney-and-client pair than Anthony Griffin and
Michael Lowe. Griffin is a black lawyer who was
counsel to the Texas chapter of the NAACP Lowe
is Grand Dragon of the Texas Ku Klux Klan, and
has resisted the Texas Human Rights
Commission's subpoena for his organization's
mailing list.
Griffin was assigned Lowe's case by the Texas
chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union. His
acceptance of Lowe as a client drew fire from black
groups, and culminated in his dismissal by the
NAACP who saw the representation as a conflict of
interest. (See Developments, page 21.)
Griffin's former instructors, Yale and Irene
Merker Rosenberg, both law professors at the
University of Houston Law Center, believe he is a
hero who has demonstrated exceptional courage
and respect for the right to privacy and free
speech.
According to Richard Delgado of the
University of Colorado Law School at Boulder,
Griffin's devotion to the First Amendment may be
admirable, but the NAACP has an equally
important-if not greater-interest in protecting
African-Americans from KKK harassment.
Yes: More Than Speech Was at Stake
BY RICHARD
DELGADO
Did the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People
act wisely in discharging Griffin as
the organization's attorney? I believe
it did, even though in letting him go,
the organization was in effect pun-
ishing Griffin for exercising his First
Amendment rights. For, by agreeing
to help a racist organization, the
attorney was injuring the NAACP in
the exercise of its rights under the
14th Amendment.
And in this standoff, the lawyer
must be the clear loser. Any other
interpretation would be hubris
putting the lawyer's interests at the
center, the client's at the periphery.
But beyond hubris, the NAACP
was right in insisting its own racial
justice and equality interests should
trump the First Amendment formal-
ist values Griffin tried so misguid-
edly to advance. If the two values
were in tension-as they were in this
case-the organization acted correctly
in telling Griffin to find another job.
Richard Delgado is co-author of
an anthology on critical race studies,
'Words That Wound" (Westuiew, 1993).
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Griffin chose to protect speech rather
than equality, and protecting equal-
ity is what the NAACP does.
But we hear the ACLU saying
that free expression is the surest
guarantor of progress for minorities.
ACLU president Nadine Strossen
has written that if African-Ameri-
cans knew their own self-interest,
they would realize that a vital First
Amendment is an indispensable pre-
condition of racial justice. Without it,
how could Martin Luther King Jr.
have spoken as he did? How could
civil rights activists have awakened
the nation's conscience?
That argument, of course, is
paternalistic. It asserts that blacks
do not know their own history and
cannot recognize their own self-
irterest. But it is also wrong. Recent
scholarship has shown that free
speech may be a reasonably good
corrective for small errors, a reason-
ably effective way of dispelling indi-
vidual or social misconceptions that
are limited. in scope.
Racism Still With Us
But it is a poor way of correcting
systemic social ills, like racism or
sexism, that are so integrated into
our thought and meaning patterns
as to be second nature. The racism of
today is rarely recognized as such.
Anyone speaking out against it is
seen as incoherent or humorless. At
most, we deem it "subtle"-nothing
to worry about.
History demonstrates the lim-
ited efficacy of speech and free
speech law. In the 1960s, civil rights
activists marched, sat in, picketed,
were arrested and convicted. Years
later, their convictions might be re-
versed on appeal-if the demonstra-
tion had been prayerful, mannerly
and not too disruptive.
But the First Amendment, as
then understood, afforded little pro-
tection to Martin Luther King Jr.
and his movement.
The current landscape of First
Amendment "exceptions" and special
doctrines makes the same point: The
system of free speech is much more
helpful to the majority than the
minority.
When a defense agency, writer,
large corporation, teacher, or other
empowered actor needs protection
against harmful speech, we quickly
come up with an exception to the
First Amendment (e.g., official or
trade secrets, libel, copyright, etc.).
But when some of the most
defenseless persons in our society,
young black undergraduates at dom-
inantly white institutions, ask for
protection in the form of a hate-
speech code, we reply that the First
Amendment must be seamless.
The system of free speech does
not operate evenly, does not afford
protection for minorities when they
need it most. 0
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As Yogi Berra might have put it,
the case of Anthony Griffin, the Ku
Klu Klan, the Texas Human Rights
Commission and the state unit of the
NAACP is a matter ofd6ja vu all over
again in a lot of ways.
Griffin is acting in the grand
tradition of the practice of law in this
country. Throughout this nation's
history, distinguished lawyers have
stepped forward to defend the Bill of
Rights against governmental attack,
through the representation of indi-
vidual clients whose rights were
under assault-regardless of whether
those individual clients were up-
standing or reprehensible.
Few should understand that
point as well as the NAACP. In the
1940s, the state of Alabama de-
manded that the NAACP turn over
the names and addresses of all its
local members and agents.
Irene Merker Rosenberg and Yale
Rosenberg teach criminal procedure
and federal jurisdiction, respectively.
Irene Rosenberg is former chair of the
board of the Houston chapter of the
American Civil Liberties Union.
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Much like Grand Dragon Mi-
chael Lowe who refused to turn over
his organization's membership list to
the Texas Commission on Human
Rights, the NAACP resisted, claim-
ing that the state's demand infringed
its First Amendment freedom of
association.
In a landmark decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court agreed, noting
that "privacy in group association
may in many circumstances be indis-
pensable to preservation of freedom
of association, particularly where a
group espouses dissident beliefs."
Granted, the Supreme Court
decision may not be dispositive here
because the state of Texas may be
able to show a more compelling need
for the information than did the state
of Alabama.
Danger in Limiting Freedoms
However, unless the state is
challenged in a judicial forum to
prove that a compelling interest ex-
ists, there is a distinct danger that
the First Amendment associational
freedom will be diminished, and in a
way that the NAACP might not
appreciate when it is its turn at bat
again.
If we define constitutional
rights so narrowly that they protect
just what we want protected and no
more-the essential core-subsequent
litigation to ascertain their scope
will be biting at the very edges of our
rights, risking incursions on, and
possible destruction of, the values we
deem most important.
In the 1970s, the Nazi Party
wanted to hold a rally in Skokie, Ill.,
no doubt precisely because many
victims of the Holocaust lived there.
Skokie officials tried to stop the
demonstration by an injunction and
vague and onerous ordinances.
Representing the Nazis, a Jew-
ish lawyer for the ACLU fought those
efforts on First Amendment grounds
and won.
Many Jews were outraged by
the ACLU's position and left the
organization, not realizing that the
government's actions effectively di-
minished every citizen's freedom to
participate in the marketplace of
ideas. It took some time for the
ACLU to recover.
The Jews who left the ACLU
over Skokie were wrong, and so is the
Texas NAACP, We are Jews, and we
understand very well who both the
Nazis and the KKK are.
And so does Anthony Griffin
understand.
But unfortunately, when you
defend civil liberties, although the
principles are lofty, the clients are
often unappetizing and the work can
get mighty lonely.
Freedom needs breathing room.
As long as there are lawyers like
Anthony Griffin around, it will be
safe. U
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